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IN THE SUPRE~IB COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
ELIZABETH SORENSON, 
vs. 
Plaintiff-
Appellant, 
GARY E. BEERS and EVELYN 
BEERS, his wife; JEFFREY 
'1ERRILL and CELESTE B. 
>!ERRILL, his wife; MATT 
BIWANIC and LOCKHART CO., 
Defendants-
Respondents. 
Case No. 15477 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an action wherein plaintiff, a defaulting trustor under 
a deed of trust, seeks to have a trustee's sale thereunder set aside and 
title revested in her free and clear of all claims of all of the defendants 
because of an alleged oral agreement with defendants that she could re-
purchase the property from them, which she alleged constituted fraud and a 
conspiracy to deprive her of the property. 
Defendants filed a counter claim claiming that plaintiff was in 
unlawful detainer of the property and praying for damages for rental value 
during the period of plaintiff's detention. 
-1-
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DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
The lower court, with the Honorable David B. Dee presiding, 
granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment, dismissing without 
prejudice the plaintiff's complaint and granting judgment to the defendants 
Beers, Merrill and Biljanic on their counterclaim. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellant seeks to have the summary judgment entered by the court 
vacated and set aside, and the case remanded to the District Court for trial 
on its merits. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On December 29, 1975, plaintiff executed a trust deed to the 
Lockhart Company securing a promissory note, which trust deed covered a 
parcel of real property located in Salt Lake County, Utah, upon which is 
situated a beer tavern known as Lefty's Lounge. Following plaintiff's 
default under the provisions of the promissory note secured by the trust 
deed, the Lockhart Company, through its successor trustee, W. Clark Burt, 
recorded on November 23, 1976, a declaration of default and demand for 
sale, and gave notice of a trustee's sale to be held April 1, 1977. 
On the evening of March 31, 1977, plaintiff initiated a telephone 
conversation with the defendant Matt Biljanic, regarding the trustee's sale 
to be held the following afternoon. During the conversation, plaintiff 
"stated to him that she could not have the necessary money ready by April 1, 
1977." (plaintiff's affidavit, R-25) From this telephone conversation, 
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plaintiff understood that defendant Biljanic would buy the property at the 
trustee's sale and give her an opportunity to buy it back, with some extra 
payment for his services. (plaintiff's affidavit R-26; plaintiff's deposi-
tion, pages 6 and 48) 
On April 1, 1977, the trustee's sale was held, and the defendant 
Gary E. Beers, as the highest bidder, purchased the property for the sum 
of $40,593.93. This purchase was made on behalf of the defendants Beers 
and Biljanic, who were to share equally in the transaction. (Biljanic 
deposition, page 24; Beers deposition, page 11) 
Later, on April 1, 1977, and subsequent to the trustee's sale, 
plaintiff again telephoned defendant Biljanic who advised her that he and 
the defendant Beers had purchased the property, and that she should contact 
the defendant Beers for details on purchasing the pr9perty back from them. 
(plaintiff's affidavit R-26; plaintiff's deposition, pages 6 and 7) 
On April 2, 1977, plaintiff met with defendant Beers who advised 
her that in order for her to purchase the property, that it would cost her 
$5,000.00 for defendant Beers, and $5,000.00 for defendant Biljanic, over 
what they had paid for the property. (plaintiff's affidavit R-26; plain~ 
tiff's deposition, page 6, 7 and 8; Biljanic's deposition, pages 18 and 
19) 
On April 5, 1977, plaintiff met again with defendant Beers and 
agreed to pay defendants Beers and Biljanic $500.00 per month as rent to 
occupy the premises and operate "Lefty's Lounge". (plaintiff's deposition 
Pages ll and 12) During the time plaintiff occupied the premises no rent 
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was in fact paid to the defendants Beers and Biljanic even though she re-
ceived the income from the operation of the tavern. On May 3, 1977, a 
:lot ice to Quit was served upon the plaintiff, but she continued to occupy 
the premises through October 11, 1977, when the premises were restored to 
the defendants. (plaintiff's deposition, pages 53 and 54) 
On April 26, 1977, plaintiff telephoned defendant Biljanic who 
advised her at that time that he would accept $5,000.00 to permit her to 
repurchase the property, but that defendant Beers wanted $10,000.00 in 
order for her to repurchase the property. (plaintiff's affidavit R-27) 
After the sale was made and the trustee's deed issued, the 
defendant Beers placed the names of the defendant Evelyn Beers, Jeffrey 
Merrill and Celeste B. Merrill on the deed, since they were participating 
with Beers and Biljanic in the transaction. (Beers deposition, page 33) 
As a result of the April 26, 1977 conversation with defendant 
Biljanic, plaintiff filed her complaint in this matter on April 26, 1977. 
An amended complaint was filed on May 11, 1977. Defendants Beers, Biljanic 
and Merrill filed an answer and a counterclaim on May 25, 1977, alleging 
plaintiff to be guilty of an unlawful detainer, and praying for damages for 
rental value and for any waste. Defendants filed a motion for summary 
judgment on May 25, 1977, which was denied on June 16, 1977, in order for 
the plaintiff to take the depositions of defendants Biljanic, Beers and 
the Lockhart Company. Depositions were taken and defendants filed their 
motion for summary judgment on July 13, 1977, moving the court to dismiss 
plaintiff's amended compalint and asking the court to grant judgment in 
favor of the defendants Beers, Biljanic and Merrill on their counterclaim. 
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While this motion was pending, plaintiff filed her second amended complaint, 
which added a third cause of action. Defendant's motion for summary judg-
ment was heard by the court, and the court entered a final order granting 
a summary judgment in favor of the defendants and against the plaintiff on 
September 28, 1977. This summary judgment granted by the court provided: 
1. That plaintfff's second amended complaint was 
dismissed without prejudice. 
2. That defendants were entitled to recover possession 
of the real property from the plaintiff. 
3. That the defendants were awarded judgment against 
the plaintiff in the sum of $2,833.33 for the rental value 
of the premises during the period of detention by the 
plaintiff, and $132.95 for costs. 
It is from the summary judgment granted by the court that this 
appeal is taken. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE LOWER COURT PROPERLY RULED THAT THE FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION 
OF THE SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT COULD NOT BE MAINTAINED AS A MATTER OF 
LAW BECAUSE IT SOUGHT RELIEF CONTRARY ID THE PROVISIONS OF 57-1-28, 
58-1-31, 25-5-3 AND 25-5-4(2) U.C.A. (1953). 
Plaintiff in her first cause of action .of her second amended 
complaint sought to have the trustee's sale set aside and title to "Lefty's 
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Lounge" revested in her free and clear of all claims of all of the defend-
ants. After an in court, paragraph by paragraph analysis of the first 
cause of action the lower court ruled that the relief sought was contrary 
to the provisions of 57-1-28, 57-1-31, 25-5-3 and 25-5-4(2) U.C.A. (1953). 
In paragraph 2 of plaintiff's first cause of action of the second 
amended complaint she alleged that the purchase of "Lefty's Lounge" by 
defendant Beers at the trustee's sale was accomplished through fraudulent 
representation to the Lockhart Company that defendants Biljanic and Beers 
were representing the plaintiff. 
In paragraph 3 thereof she alleged that the sale did not take 
place at the time and place stated in the notice of sale. 
In paragraph 4 thereof she alleged that but for the deception of 
the defendants the sale would not have taken place and that at the time of 
the sale plaintiff had made arrangements for the purchase of said property. 
(second a.mended complaint, R-95) 
With respect to all of these allegations, the lower court found 
that they were contrary to the recitals contained in the trustee's deed 
upon sale, which states that on April 1, 1977, at 12: 00 noon, at the Court's 
Building, Gary E. Beers as the highest bidder, purchased Lefty's Lounge 
for $40,593.93. The lower court, relying in part on 57-1-28 U.C.A. (1953), 
found that the trustee's deed itself was conclusive evidence that the sale 
did in fact take place at the time and place set forth in the notice of 
Sale. Section 57-1-28(1) U.C.A. (1953) reads: 
"The trustee's deed may contain recitals of compliance 
with the requirements of the act relating to the exercise of 
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the power of sale and the sale of property described therein, 
including recitals concerning any mailing, personal delivery 
and publication of the notice of default, any mailing and 
the publication and posting of notice of sale, and the conduct 
of sale and such recitals shall constitute prima facia 
evidence of such compliance and conclusive evidence thereof 
in favor of bona fide purchasers and encumbrancers for value 
and without notice." 
The court determined that plaintiff's allegation that the sale 
did not take place as stated in the notice of sale was based on the word 
of two of plaintiff's friends, Koslowski and Jones, who reported that they 
" ••• didn't see any action around the area of the sale." (plaintiff's 
deposition, page 22; affidavit of Jones, R-21; affidavit of Koslowski, R-23) 
The court then held that the Koslowski and Jones statements did not raise 
a material issue of fact, but simply determined that both Koslowski and 
Jones were in the vacinity of the courthouse at approximately noon on April 
1, 1977, and that they did not personally witness the trustee's sale. 
With respect to paragraph 4 of plaintiff's first cause of action 
of the second amended complaint, the lower court found that plaintiff's 
allegations that at the time and place of the sale she had made arrangements 
for the purchase of the property was contrary to the statement contained in 
Paragraph 3 of plaintiff's affidavit (plaintiff's affidavit, R-25) and con-
trary to her testimony that she did not have the necessary money on April 1, 
1977 to redeem the property (plaintiff's deposition, page 5) The lower 
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court also found the allegations contained therein that defendants Biljanic 
and Beers purchased the property for $40,593.93 knowing full well that the 
value of the property was in excess thereof was immaterial in that the 
trustee's deed recited that defendant Beers was the highest bidder, and that 
was all :that was required under the trust deed statute, 57-1-28 U.C.A. (1953). 
Paragraph 6 of plaintiff's first cause of action of the second 
aJ11ended complaint alleged an oral agreement wherein defendants Biljanic and 
Beers "indicated" that they would allow plaintiff, to purc~ase the property 
for an additional $5,000.00 over and above the purchase price paid at the 
trustee's sale, when in fact said defendants intended to sell it for what-
ever the market would bear. (second amended complaint, R-96) 
The lower court found that if, by that allegation, plaintiff 
claimed an oral agreement to sell the property which the defendants' Biljanic 
and Beers breached, th.at such· an alleged agreement wouid be uninforceable 
under the provisions of 25-5-3 U.C.A. (1953) which provides that: 
"Every contract ••• for the sale of any land, or any 
interest in lands, shall be void unless. the contract, or some 
note or memorandum thereof, is in writing subscribed by the 
party to whom the ••• sale is to be made, or by his lawful 
agent thereunto authorized in writing." 
The court also found that ii' by the allegations in paragraphs 2 
and 6 of plain.tif:f's first cause of action of the second ·amended complaint, 
she was claiming an oral agreement whereby defendants Biljanic and Beers 
were to redeem the property for her, that the agreement was barred by the 
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provisions of 25-5-4(2) U.C.A. (1953) which similarly provides that: 
"In the following cases every agreement shall be void 
unless such agreement or some note or memorandum thereof, is 
in writing subscribed by the party to be charged therewith; 
every promise to answer for the debt, default or miscarriage 
of another." 
The lower court found that the first cause of action of plaintiff's 
second amended complaint wherein the plaintiff sought a judgment declaring 
the trustee's sale void and revesting title in her free and clear of all 
claims of all of the defendants (second amended complaint, R-98) was con-
trary to the provisions of 57-1-28( 2) U.C.A. (1953) which provided that the 
trustee's deed shall operate to convey to the purchaser, without right of 
redemption, the trustee's title, and all of the right, title and interest 
and claim of the turstor, which in this case is the plaintiff. The court 
found further that the first cause of action of the second amended complaint 
was simply an attempt to circumvent the requirements of 57-1-31 U.C.A. (1953) 
which sets forth the only wa:;r that the plaintiff could cure the default and 
reinstate the trust deed; and it found that those requirements needed to have 
been accomplished within three months of the notice and prior to the trustee's 
sale, which plaintiff failed to do. 
POINT II 
THE LOWER COURT PROPERLY RULED THAT THE FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION OF 
THE SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT FILED TO SET FORTH A STATEMENT OF FACTS TO 
SUPPORT A CLAIM OF FRAUD. 
-9-
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The lower court found that the allegations that defendnats Biljanic 
and Beers agreed to allow plaintiff to purchase the property for $10,000.00 
over and above the purchase price paid at the trustee's sale, when in fact 
they intended to sell it for whatever the market would bear, did not allege 
facts sufficient to establish fraud because the alleged representations were 
promissory in nature only. (second amended complaint, R-96) The court relied 
on Adamson v. Brockbank, ll2 Ut •. 2d 52, 185 P.2d 269 (1947) at 276, wherein 
the Utah Supreme Court stated that in order to constitute actionable fraud, 
the false representations must relate to past or present facts and cannot 
be merely promissory or expressions of opinions. 
The lower court found further that the fact that defendants re-
fused to sell to plaintiff at the orally agreed price did not constitute 
fraud either, relying on Schow v. Guartone, 18 Ut. 2d 135, 417 P.2d 643 
(1966) wherein the Utah Supreme Court held that the fact that a promiser 
failed to perform his promise would not suffice to make out a charge of 
fraud. 
POINT III 
THE LOWER COURT PROPERLY RULED THAT THE ALTERATION OF THE TRUSTEE'S 
DEED DID NOT AFFECT THE VALIDITY OF THE INSTRUMENT AS BETWEEN THE SUCCESSOR 
TRUSTEE AND DEFENDANT BEERS. 
Paragraph 7 of plaintiff's first cause of action of the second 
amended complaint alleged that the trustee 1 s deed was altered by defendant 
Beers to include as additional grantees defendants Evelyn Beers, Jeffrey 
Merrill and Celeste Merrill. (second a.mended complaint, R-96) The lower 
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court properly ruled that the effect of the alteration had no bearing on 
the outcome of this case. The alteration was made by defendant Beers in 
an attempt to create a co-tenancy between defendants Gary E. Beers, Evelyn 
Beers, Jeffrey Merrill and Celeste Merrill, (Beers deposition, page 39) 
Following the reasoning set forth in 4 Am Jur 2nd, Alteration of Instru-
ments, Section 47 at page 45, the lower court held that the attempt at 
creating a co-tenancy was void and that the alteration should, as a matter 
of law, be ignored, but, that the trustee's deed was val.id and inforceable 
according to its original terms as between the trustee and defendant Beers. 
POINT IV 
THE LOWER COURT PROPERLY DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE THE THIRD 
CAUSE OF ACTION OF THE SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT UNDER RULES 8 AND 12 OF 
THE UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE. 
The lower court, after consideration of the third cause of action 
of plaintiff's second amended complaint, granted the defendants' motion to 
dismiss without prejudice under Rules 8 and 12 of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure. 
The lower court found that the third cause of action of the second 
a.mended complaint, as written, did not give defendants sufficient notice 
of the nature or substance of the acts allegedly committed by the defendants, 
nor did it sufficiently set forth the legal grounds under which plaintiff 
sought relief. 
Paragraph 2 thereof alleged that the defendant Biljanic, as a 
member of the Utah State Bar, was bound by the cannons of ethics thereof. 
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Paragraph 3 thereof alleged that the plaintiff contacted defendant 
3iljanic on March 31, 1977, and requested that he represent her at the 
Grustee's sale set the following day and that said defendant agreed to 
such representation. 
Paragraph 4 thereof alleged that defendant Biljanic failed and 
neglected to inform plaintiff that he could not represent her because he 
had already represented another client in a proposed action against the 
plaintiff, and further that he had resolved to bid on the property for hilll-
self and others. 
Paragraph 5 thereof alleged that defendant Biljanic, in concert 
with others, appeared at the sale and purchased the property for hilllself 
rather than bid for and on behalf of the plaintiff. 
Paragraph 6 thereof alleged that defendant Biljanic, acted in a 
manner calculated to mislead and deceive the plaintiff, and that at no tillle 
did he act in a manner consistent with the cannons of ethics of the pro-
fession of the practice of law. 
Paragraph 7 thereof alleged that defendant Biljanic was aided 
and abedded by defendant Gary Beers, Evelyn Beers, Jeffrey Merrill and 
Celeste Merrill in the conspiracy. 
Finally, paragraph 8 thereof alleged that in aid of the conspir-
acy, defendants Beers and Biljanic, represented to the Lockhart Company 
that they were acting for and on behalf of plaintiff. 
Following the rules set forth in Blackham v. Snelgrove, 3 Ut.2d 
157, 280 P.2d 453 (1955). that under Rules 8 and 12 of the Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure a complaint is required to give the opposing parties fair 
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notice of the nature and basis or grounds of the claim and a general indi-
cation of the type of litigation involved. The lower court found that while 
paragraphs 2 through 8 of the third cause of action alleged a breach of the 
cannons of ethics by defendant Biljanic and a conspiracy with the remaining 
defendants, that plaintiff had not alleged acts or conduct by the defendants 
with sufficient particularity to set forth the elliments of a claim for fraud, 
malpractice, breach of contract or conspiracy, and that therefore the third 
cause of action as written failed to state a claim upon which relief could 
be granted. 
The lower court was correct in its ruling, since in general a 
civil conspiracy must allege a combination of two or more persons by some 
concerted action to accomplish an unlawful purpose which causes injury to 
the plaintiff. (16 Am Jur 2nd, Conspiracy, Section 43) Plaintiff's primary 
complaint is that defendants bid and purchased the property at the trustee's 
sale for themselves rather than for her. Apart from the fact that the alle-
gation is barred by the provisions of 25-5-4(2) U.C.A. (1953), as long as 
the defendants sought only to further their own fair interest, they cannot 
be liable as part of a conspiracy for any incidental damage to the plaintiff. 
(16 Am Jur 2nd, Conspiracy, Section 43) Even if defendants purchased the 
property at the trustee's sale for themselves and not for the plaintiff, 
they cannot be liable for a conspiracy for a lawful act. The act in this 
case was defendants' bidding in at a trustee's sale which any member of the 
public was entitled to bid on. 
POINT V 
THE LOWER COURT PROPERLY FOUND THAT DEFENDANTS WERE ENTITLED TO 
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A SUMMAB.Y JUDGMENT ON THEIR COUNTERCLAIM. 
The lower court granted defendants' motion for summary judgment 
on their counterclaim which was brought under the unlawful detainer statute, 
78-36-2 U.C.A. (1953) for restitution of the premises and judgment against 
plaintiff for damages for the rental value or- reasonable value for the use 
and occupancy of the pr-emises during the period of detention by the plain-
tiff. 
The lower court found that defendant Beers purchased the proper-ty 
on behalf of defendants Beers and Bilj anic at the trustee's sale held on 
April 1, 1977. (Hogge deposition, page 8; Biljanic deposition, page 24; 
Beers deposition, page 11) And that on April 5, 1977 plaintiff agreed to 
pay defendants $500.00 per month as rent in order to use and occupy the 
premises. (plaintiff's deposition, pages 11 and 12) 
The lower court found fur-ther that on May 13, 1977 a notice to 
quit was ser-ved on the plaintiff by defendnats, (Sorensen deposition, page 
54; Beers deposition, page 40; and Beers Exhibit No. 2) and that plaintiff 
was occupying the premises and had occupied the premises since April 5, 1977, 
without having made any rent payment even though during this period of time 
she collected the income from the operation of "Lefty's Lounge". (Sorensen 
deposition, pages 53 and 54) 
On this basis, the lower court granted defendants a judgment 
ordering that defendants were entitled to recover possession of the real 
property from the plaintiff and that defendants were entitled to a judgment 
against the plaintiff in the sum of $2,.833.33 for the rental value of the 
property for the use and occupancy of the premises during the period of 
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detention by the plaintiff. 
The lower court relied for its authority on the California case 
of Abraha.mer v. Parks, 269 P. 2d 341 ( 1956), which involved the following 
facts. The defendant [in this case the plaintiff] executed a trust deed 
as security for the payment of a promissory note. The defendant then de-
faulted and the trustee sold the property to the plaintiff [the defendants 
in this case]. Plaintiff gave the defendant, who was in possession, a three 
day notice to quit and the defendant refused to quit. Plaintiff then 
brought an unlawful detainer action to recover possession of the property 
[defendants' counterclaim in this case]. The California Supreme Court held 
that all the plaintiff had to prove was the acquisition of the property at 
a trustee's sale and the service of notice to quit on defendant. Plaintiff 
was not required to prove more with respect to title. The court also held 
that issues raised by the defendant as to whether the defendant was actually 
in default and whether plaintiff was a bona fide purchaser and encumbrancer 
for value without notice could not be litigated. 
The lower court simply relied upon the testimony of the plaintiff 
in granting defendants' motion for summary judgment on their counterclaim. 
POINT VI 
SUMMARY' JUDGMENT IS PROPER WHEN THE FACTS AS ASSERTED BY THE 
PARTY RULED AGAINST ESTABLISH THAT THE MOVING PARTY IS ENTITLED TO A JUDG-
MENT AS A MATTER OF LAW. 
The plaintiff on appeal alleges that the lower court erred in 
granting defendants' motion for summary judgment because there were numer-
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ous material facts at issue. 
Not only does the plaintiff not specifically set forth what facts 
were at issue, and how they wuld alter the outcome of the case, but she 
overlooks the careful examination the lower court gave the second amended 
complaint, the documentary evidence and the depositions on file in this 
case, in arriving at its decision. In ruling on the motion, the court only 
considered those facts which were not in dispute, using plaintiff's own 
testimony, or her allegations contained in the second amended complaint, 
in arriving at its decision that defendnats were entitled to summary judg-
ment as a matter of law. 
The defendants agree with Justice Crocket's statement in his 
opinion in the case of Holbrook Co. v. Adams, 542 P.2d 191 (1975) wherein 
he stated: 
"It is not the purpose of the summary judgment pro-
cedure to judge the credibility of the averments of parties, 
or witnesses, or the weight of evidence. Neither is it to 
deny parties the right to a trial to resolve disputed is.sues 
of fact. Its purpose is to eliminate the time, trouble and 
expense of trial when upon any view taken of the facts as 
asserted by the party ruled against• he would not be entitled 
to prevail. Only when it so appears, is the court justified 
in refusing such a party the opportunity of presenting his 
evidence and attempting to persuade the trier of facts to 
his views. Conversely, if there is any dispute as t9 any 
issue, material to the settlement of the controversy, the 
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summary judgment should not be granted." 
The lower court properly concluded that in spite of everything 
contended by the plaintiff, the defendants were entitled to judgment as 
a matter of law, as more specifically set forth in Points I through VI of 
defendants' brief. To quote again from Justice Crocket in F & A Financial. 
Corporation v. Bills, Inc., 17 Ut.2d 80, 404 P.2d 670 (1965) at page 71. 
"The granting of the summary judgment under those 
circumstances had the salutary effect of saving the time, 
effort and expense which would have been involved in having 
a trial, which could have served no useful purpose.'' 
CONCLUSION 
It is necessary to look at this case in perspective. The plain-
tiff is a defaulting trustor under. a trust deed, who by her own testimony 
was unable to redeem the property and reinstate the trust deed within the 
three month time period prescribed by 57-1-31 U.C.A. (1953). It should 
also be remembered that the Lockhart Company gave plaintiff not only the 
minimum three month period as prescribed by that statute, but allowed her 
over five months, and plaintiff still was unable to cure the default within 
that time. Now plaintiff is seeking to get around the fact that she failed 
to cure the default and reinstate the trust deed by attempting to set aside 
the trustee's sale because of an alleged oral agreement that hll.!i its origins 
in a telephone conversation the very night before the trustee's sale and on 
several conversations subsequent to the sale, which plaintiff contends cul-
minated in an agreement whereby she could repurchase the proeprty from the 
defendants for $10,000.00 over and above the purchase price paid by the 
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defendants at the trustee's sale. 
The lower court found properly that all the plaintiff was attempt-
ing to do was circumvent the req_uirements of 57-1-31 U.C.A. (1953), and 
that the relief she sought was contrary to the provisions of 57-1-28(2) 
u.c.A. (1953) which provides that the trust deed shall operate to convey 
to the purchaser without right of redemption the trustee's title and all 
right, title and interest and claim of the plaintiff, The lower court 
also found that the relief plaintiff sought was barred by 25-5-3 and 25-5-4(2) 
U.C.A. (1953), and that further plaintiff had failed to set forth a state-
ment of facts sufficient to support either a claim of fraud or conspiracy. 
By dismissing plaintifff's second a.mended complaint without prejudice and 
granting defendants' judgment under their counterclaim, the trial court 
saved both parties the time and expense and burden of a trial that would 
have ultimately resulted in the same verdict against plaintiff~ 
Respectfully submitted, 
KEITH BIESINGER 
Attorney for Respondents 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
Mailed three copies of the foregoing to Walter R. Ellett, Attorney 
for Appellant, 5085 South State Street, Murray, Utah 84107, postage prepaid. 
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